What the MX lookup checks
The tool reads the MX records of the domain and lists each mail host with its preference value. Where the hostnames match a well-known provider pattern it names the likely provider. It then fetches the SPF policy from the TXT records of the domain and the DMARC policy from _dmarc under the domain, parses both and reports findings.
Everything here is read from public DNS. The tool does not connect to your mail server, send test messages or look inside any mailbox.
Reading MX records
Sending servers try the MX host with the lowest preference number first and move to higher numbers only if that fails. Equal numbers share load. An MX target must be a hostname that resolves to an address; it must not be an IP address and must not be a CNAME. If a domain has no MX record at all, senders fall back to the domain's A or AAAA record, which is rarely what anyone intends.
A domain that should never receive mail can publish a null MX, a single record with preference 0 and a target of a single dot. That tells senders to fail immediately instead of retrying for days.
SPF: who may send for the domain
SPF is a TXT record beginning with v=spf1 that lists the servers allowed to use the domain in the envelope sender address. The findings look for the mistakes that break it in practice: more than one SPF record, which makes evaluation fail outright; mechanisms that require more than ten DNS lookups once includes are followed; the deprecated ptr mechanism; and an ending of +all, which authorises the entire internet.
A policy ending in ~all asks receivers to treat other sources with suspicion, and -all asks them to reject. Either is reasonable when combined with DMARC. A record with ?all or no all mechanism provides almost no protection.
DMARC: policy and reporting
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM to the address people actually see in the From header. A message passes when SPF or DKIM passes and the authenticated domain aligns with the From domain. The record states what receivers should do with failures, none, quarantine or reject, and where to send aggregate reports.
p=none is the right starting point because it lets you collect reports without affecting delivery. It is not a destination. A domain that stays on p=none indefinitely has visibility but no protection against spoofing. The tool shows the policy, the subdomain policy if set, the pct value and the report addresses.
Why DKIM needs a selector
DKIM public keys are published at selector._domainkey.example.com, and the selector is an arbitrary label chosen by the sending system. A domain can have many selectors and DNS offers no way to list them, so no tool can discover a DKIM key from the domain name alone. You can find the selector in the DKIM-Signature header of a message sent from the domain, in the s= tag, and then query that name with a DNS lookup.
What these records cannot prove
Correct MX, SPF, DKIM and DMARC records are necessary for reliable delivery but they do not guarantee that a message lands in the inbox. Mailbox providers also weigh sender reputation, complaint rates, content and recipient engagement, none of which is visible in DNS. Likewise, a clean configuration does not prove that mail is flowing. It shows that the published policy is coherent, which is the part you can fix from the DNS side.